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SPECIAL EDUCATION ARBITRATION :
“RIGHTNESS” AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT?
By
Stephen S. Worthington*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Public school officials in the United States are gearing up1 for the reauthorization
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).2 Refining IDEA’s rules
over dispute resolution in special education will be a critical issue as Congress considers
amending IDEA.3 The centerpiece of IDEA’s dispute resolution regime, the due process
hearing, has become the focus of a vigorous debate among special education scholars and
stakeholders. While some commentators criticize due process hearings as unfair,
excessively costly, and detrimental to school-parent relationships,4 others defend the due
process hearing as an effective and essential safeguard of students’ rights.5
While IDEA already encourages use of mediation,6 critics have argued that
special education mediation is plagued with its own shortcomings and does not
adequately address the problems raised by due process hearings.7 One scholar, Professor
*

Stephen S. Worthington is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2016
joint J.D./M.A. Candidate in Law and Educational Theory & Policy at The Pennsylvania State University.
1

NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA):
EARLY
PREPARATION
FOR
REAUTHORIZATION
(August
2014),
available
at
https://nsba.org/sites/default/files/reports/Issue%20Brief-Individuals%20with%20Disabilities%20
Education%20Act.pdf; SASHA PUDELSKI, AM. ASS’N SCH. ADM’RS, RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE
PROCESS 2 (April 2013) available at http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/
Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Education/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf.
2

IDEA grew ripe for reauthorization in 2011, but its reauthorization has been delayed along with other key
education statutes in a deeply divided Congress. Alyson Klein, Education Laws Overdue for Renewal
Languish
in
Congress,
EDUC.
WK.,
Jan.
15,
2014,
at
1,
19,
available
at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/01/15/17congress_ep.h33.html.
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Tracy Gershwin Mueller, Litigation and Special Education: The Past, Present, and Future Direction for
Resolving Conflicts Between Parents and School Districts, J. OF DISABILITY POL’Y STUDIES (Prepublished
Aug, 20, 2014), DOI: 10.1177/1044207314533382.
4

See S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32 J. N AT ’L A SS’N
A DMIN . L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012); Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need
for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & E DUC . 501 (2013); See also
P UDELSKI, supra note 1.
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Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 501 (2014).
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20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2014).

7
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S. James Rosenfeld,8 has proposed adopting an arbitration alternative for special
education disputes.9 Noting that due process hearings aim for the right answer as a
matter of law regardless of whether the result would be acceptable to either party,
Professor Rosenfeld posits that “arbitration can reach for the ‘right answer as a matter of
law and fact.’”10 If successful, Professor Rosenfeld’s arbitration alternative could create a
“goldilocks” option for disputants who wish to avoid both the adversary climate of due
process hearings and the bargaining disparities of mediation.
This article seeks to extend consideration of Professor Rosenfeld’s proposed
arbitration alternative for special education disputes. First, this article will survey the
current dispute resolution landscape under IDEA, and then provide an overview of
Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal. Pursuant to Professor Rosenfeld’s invitation11 to
promote dialogue on his proposal, this article will then explore considerations in
designing an arbitration alternative for special education.
II.  

OVERVIEW OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION

IDEA12 was originally enacted in 1975 as the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990.13
IDEA provides states with federal funding to educate students with disabilities according
to its provisions.14 Under IDEA, all students with disabilities covered by the Act must be
provided a free, appropriate, public education15 according to an individualized education
program.16 IDEA also provides mechanisms for resolving special education disputes.17
This section will provide a brief overview of IDEA’s key provisions, and then discuss
dispute resolution under IDEA.
8

Distinguished Practitioner in Residence and Director of Education Law Programs at the Seattle University
School of Law.
9

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 550.

10

Id. at 563.

11

Id. at 552 (proposal “is set forth in the hope and expectation that others can and will identify oversights
and make additional suggestions”).
12

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2014).

13

LAURA ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 19-20 (5th ed. 2014).

14

Id. at 35-36.

15

Id. at 35; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2014).

16

Id. at 37; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2014).

17

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2014).
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A.  Key Provisions of IDEA
The cornerstone18 of IDEA is the child’s right to a free, appropriate, public
education (“FAPE”) that is individualized to the student in conformance with state
standards.19 The controlling standard for appropriateness of educational services was set
by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley.20 In Rowley, the Court
concluded that educational services are appropriate when the services are “individually
designed to provide educational benefit” to the student.21 Judges and hearing officers
applying the Rowley standard have followed a pattern of deference to the professional
judgment of “school”22 personnel on questions of educational appropriateness.23
Commentators have generally criticized the Rowley standard as flimsy, but Congress and
the courts have declined to elevate the standard.24
Schools implement IDEA’s FAPE requirements through individualized education
programs (“IEPs”).25 An IEP is a written plan identifying the student’s unique
educational needs and the corresponding services the student will receive.26 An IEP must
describe the following:

18

Perry A. Zirkel, Is it Time for Elevating the Standard for FAPE Under IDEA?,
CHILDREN 497, 497 (2013).
19

79

EXCEPTIONAL

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2014).

20

458 U.S. 176 (1982); See also Mark C. Weber, Common-Law Interpretation of Appropriate Education:
The Road Not Taken in Rowley, 41 J. L. & E DUC . 95 (2012) (“Thirty years old in 2012, Rowley remains the
Supreme Court’s sole pronouncement on the meaning of the duty to provide appropriate education for
children with disabilities.”).
21

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.

22

This article uses the term “school” as shorthand for “local educational agency,” defined under IDEA as a
public authority with control over public elementary or secondary education within a political subdivision.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (2014).
23

Zirkel, supra note 18, at 501.

24

Id. (surveying scholarly commentary, case law, and legislation arising from Rowley); see also CopeKasten, supra note 4, at 522-23 (quoting ALJ’s characterization of Rowley as “a pretty low bar” which
prevents better outcomes).
25

ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 148.

26

Id.
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1.   The student’s current academic achievement and how the student’s
disability affects his or her performance;
2.   The student’s annual academic and functional goals and how progress
toward those goals will be measured and reported;
3.   The educational services the student will receive and the schedule for
providing those services;
4.   The level of inclusion with nondisabled students;
5.   Standardized testing accommodations;
6.   Goals and services to enable the student to succeed after exiting the
education
system.27
IEPs are developed by a team that includes educators from the student’s school, the
student’s parents, and (where appropriate) the student.28
B.  Existing Dispute Resolution Processes
Occasionally, disputes between parents and schools arise over a student’s special
education services.29 IDEA provides a range of processes to resolve disputes including
due process hearings, mediation, or complaint investigation.30 This subsection will
discuss each in turn.
1.   Due Process Hearings
Under IDEA, schools or parents may request a due process hearing (“DPH”) to
resolve disputes.31 A DPH is an adversarial proceeding in which an impartial hearing
officer issues a decision based on the parties’ evidence.32 It features a number of
procedural protections, including the right to bring legal counsel, confrontation of
witnesses, exclusion of improperly disclosed evidence, and access to a record of the
proceeding and decision.33 DPH disputants must also follow IDEA’s notice
requirements.34 Parents have additional rights to have the child present, open the hearing
27

34 CFR § 300.320 (2014).

28

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2014).

29

ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 246.

30

Id. at 246, 259 n.32.

31

Id. at 246.

32

Id.

33

34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a) (2014).

34

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7) (2014).
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to the public, and receive a copy of the record and decision at no cost.35 Parents may
recover their attorneys’ fees if they prevail at the hearing, and schools may recover
attorneys’ fees if the claim was not pursued in good faith.36 DPH decisions may be
appealed to state educational agencies, and then to state or federal court.37
The adversarial nature of DPH has attracted a number of criticisms.38 Although
IDEA’s due process provisions were intended to resolve disputes “as quickly as
practicable,”39 the DPH has gradually become less efficient and more judicialized.40 This
trend contravenes both students’ interest in timely educational services, and schools’
interest in cost savings.41 Because schools come to the proceedings with institutional
advantages over parents, the inefficiencies of due process procedures are especially
burdensome for parents.42
The DPH can also damage relationships.43 Because the DPH process is designed
to pit parents against schools, a DPH may push already strained relationships to the point
of no return.44 Due process disputants posture themselves to defeat the other party, rather
than find a solution, thereby increasing hostilities.45 As a result, future disputes between
the parent and school can escalate more quickly.46 The party bearing the brunt of this
deteriorated relationship is the child, who may receive lower quality educational services
or be removed from school out of spite.47
35

34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c) (2014).

36

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2014) (allowing schools to recover attorneys’ fees if parents’ claims are
frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or presented for an improper purpose).
37

20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), -(i) (2014).

38

See supra note 4; see also Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping
Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. N AT ’L A SS’N A DMIN . L.
JUDICIARY 27 (2007).
39

121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975) (statement by Sen. Harrison Williams).

40

Zirkel, Karanxha, & D’Angelo, supra note 38.

41

Id. at 47-48.

42

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 550 (noting that parents typically bear the burden of persuasion and are
barred from recovering expert witness fees); see also Zirkel, supra note 18, at 503-05 (illustrating parents’
difficulty overcoming hearing officers’ deference to schools on questions of educational practice).
43

Cope-Kasten, supra note 4, at 514-18.

44

Id. at 514.

45

Id. at 516.

46

Id. at 518.

47

Cope-Kasten, supra note 4, at 517.
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2. Mediation
To address the problems stemming from DPH’s shortcomings, Congress amended
IDEA in 1997 and 2004 to encourage mediation of special education disputes.48
Mediation under IDEA must be voluntary, not used to delay parents’ procedural or
substantive rights, and conducted by a trained, impartial mediator at no cost to the
parties.49 States must maintain a roster of qualified mediators.50 Mediation discussions
under IDEA, if successful, cannot be admitted as evidence in due process or judicial
hearings.51 Mediated agreements are enforceable in state or federal court.52
While mediation is less taxing on the parties’ relationship and finances, it suffers
from its own disadvantages.53 The structure of special education mediation is more likely
to produce mediators who are biased in favor of schools than of parents.54 For instance, a
Pennsylvania study found that experience in education was valued in those applying to
become special education mediators, while experience as a parent of a child with
disability was not valued.55 Additionally, schools—as institutional, repeat players—
have greater familiarity with the mediation process and are more likely to develop
relationships with mediators than parents, who are typically one-shot players.56
Even if this structural bias were corrected, mediation, by its nature, does little to
alleviate bargaining disparities between parents and schools.57 Because mediation
foregoes procedural safeguards in favor fostering agreement, the process cannot “level

48

Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Reauthorized Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement ACT (IDEIA) of 2004: Where do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 P EPP.
D ISP. R ESOL . L. J. 65, 71-76 (2007).
49

20 U.SC. § 1415(e)(2)(A), -(D) (2014).

50

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(C) (2014).

51

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(i) (2014).

52

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) (2014).

53

Cope-Kasten, supra note 4, at 532-37; Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 548-49; See also infra notes 55-56.

54

See infra notes 55-56.

55

See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real
Disputants about Institutionalized Mediation and its Value, 19 O HIO S T . J. D ISP. R ESOL . 573, 660 (2004).
See also Sonja Kerr & Jenai St. Hill, Mediation of Special Education Disputes in Pennsylvania, 15 U. P A .
J.L. & S OC . C HANGE 179, 191-92 (2012).
56

See Nancy A. Welsh, What is (Im)partial enough in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 A RIZ . L. R EV .
395, 416-27 (2010) (describing the advantages of repeat players and potential partiality of embedded
neutrals in the arbitration context).
57

Kerr & St. Hill, supra note 55, at 181-83.
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the playing field.”58 Mediators cannot mitigate these disparities by advising parents
because such assistance would undermine the mediator’s neutrality and contravene
IDEA’s requirement that mediators remain impartial.59
3. State Complaint Investigation
State educational agencies are charged with monitoring and enforcing schools’
implementation of IDEA.60 So states can fulfill this role, states must provide complaint
procedures for any interested party alleging a violation of IDEA.61 This includes parents
seeking enforcement of their child’s special education rights, as well as individuals or
advocacy groups seeking to remedy systemic violations.62 Upon receiving a complaint,
the state must complete an investigation and issue a written decision within sixty days.63
Remedies include facilitating negotiation between the school and complainant, requiring
the school to obtain technical assistance in complying with IDEA, and corrective action.64
States must treat a DPH decision as binding when making complaint decisions, and may
not investigate issues currently being contested in a DPH.65
IDEA’s complaint investigation procedures are under-researched.66 Studies from
the late 1990s indicate that states tend to focus narrowly on IDEA’s procedural
requirements in complaint investigations, rather than the substantive requirements of

58

Kerr & St. Hill, supra note 55, at 181-83.

59

Id. at 191.

60

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A) (2014); 34 C.F.R. § 300.600(a) (2014).

61

34 C.F.R. § 300.151(a) (2014).

62

34 C.F.R. § 300.152(a); see generally 4-10C JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW §  10C.04[5][a] (2014),
available from Lexis Advance (providing overview of state complaint procedures under IDEA).
63

34 C.F.R. § 300.152(a) (2014).

64

34 C.F.R. § 300.152(b) (2014).

65

34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c) (2014).

66

Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A Roadmap to Legal Dispute Resolution for Students with
Disabilities, 23 J. OF S PECIAL E DUC . L EADERSHIP 100, 104 (2010) (state complaint procedure “is neither
well known nor well understood”); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 N OTRE D AME L. R EV . 1413, 1425 n.58 (state complaint investigations “remain surprisingly
understudied”); Mueller, supra note 3, at 3 (“Research about IDEA dispute resolution procedures does not
address parent or educator perceptions of the state complaint procedure.”).
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FAPE.67 That research also suggests that parents who file state complaints rather than
DPH requests tend to be poorer, less educated, and less likely to have legal assistance.68
III.

AN ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVE?

In the commercial context, arbitration is valued for a flexibility that allows
disputes to reach equitable and economic resolution without the burden of protracted
judicial procedures.69 The “less adversarial tenor” of arbitration also helps to preserve
business relationships between commercial disputants.70 As discussed supra, concerns
over equity, economy, and preserving relationships are also the primary problems
afflicting special education disputes. Arbitration may be a powerful tool for improving
dispute resolution in special education.
Professor James Rosenfeld proposes creating such an arbitration option for special
education disputes.71 To insulate arbitrators from the influence of state and local
education agencies, Professor Rosenfeld suggests that special education arbitration be
administered by independent, non-profit organizations such as bar associations, advocacy
organizations, or law schools.72 The administering organization would bill state
education agencies for arbitration services.73 Professor Rosenfeld contends that adding
an arbitration alternative to existing dispute resolution systems would result in substantial
cost-savings because disputants who would otherwise choose costly DPH procedures or
appeal of mediation decisions would instead opt for the greater economy of arbitration.74
67

Nicole Suchey & Dixie Snow Huefner, The State Complaint Procedure Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 64 E XCEPTIONAL C HILDREN 529, 535 (1998) (survey of 35 states finding that
only 27 of those states investigate substantive issues); Michael J. Opuda, A Comparison of Parents Who
Initiated Due Process Hearings and Complaints in Maine 67-68 (Nov. 17, 1997) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), available at ProQuest Dissertations & Theses 9923374
(finding that complaint investigations tended to address procedural issues more often than DPHs).
68

Opuda, supra note 67, at 54, 58, 71.

69

THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 11-12 (6th Ed.
2012); See also LEONARD L. RISKIN, JAMES E. WESTRBOOK, CHRIS GUTHRIE, RICHARD C. REUBEN,
JENNIFER ROBBENNOLT, & NANCY A. WELSH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS: CASES AND
M ATERIALS 563 (5 th Ed. 2014) (“The underlying reasons that many parties choose arbitration over litigation
are the relative capacities for speed, cost savings, and greater efficiency in the arbitral process.”).
70

C ARBONNEAU , supra note 69, at 13. Although arbitration is less adversarial than judicial litigation,
arbitration is more adversarial than mediation. R ISKIN ET AL ., supra note 69, at 567-71 (“[A]rbitration is
much more akin to litigation than is either negotiation or mediation.”).
71

Rosenfeld, supra note 4.

72

Id. at 564

73

Id. at 566.

74

Id.
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Professor Rosenfeld further suggests that special education arbitration be administered at
the national level to achieve economy of scale, resulting in additional cost-savings.75
Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal has four key features: First, attorneys would be
excluded from arbitral proceedings unless the parents allow otherwise; second, the
arbitral panel would consist of a disability expert, an educator, and a lawyer to ensure that
the panel possesses the necessary expertise to reach a fair decision; third, the panel would
issue a final, binding decision resembling an IEP within 30 days of receiving an
arbitration request; fourth, parties, notably parents, would only enter arbitration with
fully-informed consent. Professor Rosenfeld posits that a “combination of all these
factors – shorter decision timeline, greater expertise, better focused objective and less
‘legal maneuvering’” will reduce the overall costs of dispute resolution.76 These four
features, and other important details of Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal, are discussed
below.
A.  Counsel Would Only Be Present In Arbitration With The Parents’ Consent.
Under Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal, parents could opt to exclude attorneys
from arbitral proceedings. Parents would make this decision at the time they submit to
arbitration, and the exclusion would apply both to attorneys representing either party and
to school personnel who happen to be attorneys.77 This feature would narrow power
disparities78 and help preserve the relationship between the parties by preventing
arbitration from assuming an adversarial character.79 Because parties would not be
represented by counsel, responsibility for developing the record would fall on the
arbitrators, similar to European civil law systems.80
B.  The Arbitration Panel Would Consist Of An Expert In The Child’s Disability,
A Special Educator, And An Attorney Versed In Special Education Law And
Dispute Resolution.
Special education disputes typically involve three areas of expertise that are rarely
found in a single person: disability, educational administration, and law.81 To ensure that
75

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 564-66.

76

Id. at 551.

77

Id. at 559.

78

Id.

79

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 551.

80

Id. at 561.

81

Id. at 563.
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the arbitrators possess the necessary expertise, Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the
panel consist of an expert in the child’s primary disability, an expert in special education
programs germane to that disability, and an attorney familiar with dispute resolution and
special education law.82 The attorney-arbitrator would assume responsibility for
management of the proceedings.83 Other matters, including the final decision itself,
would be determined by a majority vote of the arbitration panel.84
Consistent with common arbitral procedure, each party would choose one
particular arbitrator, and the two party-selected arbitrators would select the third
arbitrator.85 Although Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal does not discuss which parties
would select which type of arbitrator, the most equitable arrangement, as discussed infra,
would provide that parents choose the disability expert, schools choose the attorney, and
the disability expert and attorney choose the educator.86 To ensure impartiality, Professor
Rosenfeld proposes that special education arbitrators adopt a code of ethics modeled on
those used by commercial arbitrators, the judiciary, or the bar.87
C. A Final, Enforceable Decision In The Form Of An IEP Would Be Issued
Within Thirty School Days Of Assignment To An Arbitration Panel.
For special education arbitration to meet its aspirations as both a fair and
economical method of resolving disputes, arbitral decisions must be quick, final, and
enforceable. Professor Rosenfeld proposes that decisions generally be rendered within
thirty schools days from assignment of the case to an arbitral panel.88 To achieve this
expediency, the arbitrators would have “explicit maximum flexibility” to set timelines
and procedure for conducting hearings, taking evidence, and issuing subpoenas.89

82

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 563.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 562.

86

See infra Part IV.C.

87

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 562.

88

Id. at 556. While Professor Rosenfeld does not specify why the deadline would be measured by school
days rather than calendar days under his proposal, school days measure the harm of delay in the educational
context more precisely than calendar days because only delay over school days results in underutilized
instructional time. The use of school days, however, raises questions about how to treat days in which a
student receives educational services outside of the school’s regular instructional calendar, such as
accelerative or remedial summer school programs. The benefits from a calendar-day standard’s ease of
application may outweigh the benefits of a school-day standard’s precision.
89

Id. at 559-60.
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Arbitrators would have discretion to consider issues sua sponte to ensure comprehensive
resolution of the case.90
The economic advantages of arbitration would be lost if parties could make costly
appeals of arbitral decisions.91 To deter appeal of arbitral decisions, Professor Rosenfeld
suggests that appellants be required to post a substantial92 bond that could only be
recovered if the appeal succeeds.93 Furthermore, formal records of the arbitral
proceeding would be kept minimal to inhibit appeal.94
Arbitral decisions must be enforceable for arbitration to be effective.95 To be
enforceable, a decision must clearly articulate the specific obligations of the parties.96 In
the special education context, an arbitral decision can achieve clarity by following the
form of an IEP.97 An arbitrated IEP would identify the student’s short-term goals,
necessary programs and services, the duration of those services, and who is responsible
for arranging, providing, and monitoring the services.98 Compliance with the arbitrated
IEP would be enforced by the state education agency through complaint procedures.99
D. Arbitration Would Require Explicit, Voluntary, And Fully Informed Consent.
Because arbitrators under Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal would wield great
power over all aspects of the arbitral proceeding, fairness demands that consent to
arbitration be fully informed and clearly voluntary.100 Professor Rosenfeld recommends
that an independent third party, such as a state or local advocacy organization or law
school clinical program, explain the arbitral process and respond to parents’ questions

90

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 560.

91

Id. at 555.

92

Professor Rosenfeld suggests that arbitrators set the bond amount on a case-by-case basis, individuated to
the financial capabilities of particular parties. Id. at 556 n.35.
93

Id. at 556.

94

Although arbitrators would rely on informal records in reaching their decision, these records would be
confidential as a matter of law. Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 558.
95

Id. at 548 n.12.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 557-58.

98

Id.

99

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 557-58.

100

Id. at 560 n.47.
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before the parents submit to arbitration.101 The independent third party would advise the
parents: of their rights under IDEA generally; that attorneys would only be present at the
parents’ option; that arbitral procedures would be set at the complete discretion of the
arbitrators; that the record of the proceeding would be confidential; and that the decision
would be final and binding.102 Professor Rosenfeld posits that parents who have a full
understanding of the arbitral process are likely to favor arbitration.103
IV.  

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGNING SPECIAL EDUCATION ARBITRATION

Professor Rosenfeld set forth his proposal “in the hope and expectation that others
can and will identify oversights and make additional suggestions.”104 The following
section, responsive to Professor Rosenfeld’s expectation, offers four additional factors to
consider in the design and practice of special education arbitration: legal standards,
principal-agent problems, procedural fairness, and mutual acceptance.
A.  Legal Standards In Special Education
Legal standards specific to special education are unlikely to prove useful to
arbitrators. Because the bulk of special education decisions center on determining what
services are “appropriate” under FAPE for a particular student, appropriateness is a
central, inescapable issue in special education cases.105 The main premise of Professor
Rosenfeld’s proposal is that arbitration can reach for a “right answer as a matter of law
and fact.”106 Because the legal standard for FAPE is so easily met,107 fulfilling “rightness
as a matter of law” is an all-but-foregone conclusion in many special education disputes.
Because legal standards are unlikely to play a significant role in special education
arbitration, decisions under Professor Rosenfeld’s proposed framework will likely turn on
matters of fact. Congress has prescribed sensitivity to individual circumstances in special
education cases through a series of amendments to IDEA. In 1997, Congress found that
IDEA’s implementation had been impeded by “low expectations” and failure to use

101

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, 552-53.

102

Id. at 554.

103

Id. at 552.

104

Id. at 552.

105

Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L.  JUD . 214, 214 (2013) (observing that the “bulk of litigation under IDEA” concerns FAPE).
106

Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 563.

107

Supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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“replicable research on proven methods.”108 Congress further revised IDEA in 2004,
requiring IEPs to be based on “peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable.”109
Although the amendments have had little impact on how judges and hearing officers
interpret IDEA,110 the new peer review provisions do provide legal grounds to base
arbitral decisions on “factual rightness” as reflected in special education research.
Because arbitral decisions under Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal are based on IEPs,
arbitrators should draw from peer-reviewed research when making findings of fact.
Likewise, since factual issues will likely turn on the panel’s interpretation of special
education research, the educator-arbitrator’s professional judgment is likely to be the
most important factor in arbitral decisions.
Enabling decision-makers to reach “the right answer as a matter of law and fact,”
can also help create a more just body of case law for special education. Professor
Rosenfeld suggests that special education arbitration be administered at the national level,
and that it develop a national decisional law.111 One potential method for realizing this
vision would consist of an administering organization analogous to the American
Arbitration Association which would maintain files of prior arbitral decisions.112 The
decisions would be indexed according to key terms representing common issues in
drafting IEPs, and could serve as a body of case law for special education arbitration.
The increased nation-wide uniformity resulting from this approach would be ideal for
IDEA disputes because IDEA is a federal statute.113
Furthermore, a national association for special education arbitration would have
an opportunity to succeed where courts have failed in developing just and meaningful
legal standards. Rowley established a judicial reluctance to identify robust legal
standards in special education.114 This reluctance is based on the judiciary’s doubts in its
own educational expertise and its unwillingness to invade the states’ role in special
108
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education.115 These concerns would be assuaged if IDEA disputes were arbitrated
through an independent, national association à la Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal because
the decision-makers would have the expertise to resolve difficult special education
questions, and because the association’s case law would only be binding on parties who
knowingly consent to arbitration.
B.  Principal-Agent Problems
One primary critique of dispute resolution in special education is that current
mechanisms place inadequate focus on the party who ought to be central to the dispute:
the child.116 Both parents and schools can lose sight of the child’s best interests in special
education disputes.117 While parents place children’s interests first in most cases,
parents’ and children’s interests can come into tension.118 On the other hand, while
schools are designed to serve the educational needs of their students, schools also face
strong incentives that can conflict with students’ interests.119 Special education
arbitration should account for these principal-agent problems in design and practice.
1.   Parent-child conflicts
Parents’ and children’s rights under IDEA are “intertwined, but also distinct.”120
While children with disabilities are entitled to free, appropriate, public education under
IDEA, parents hold extensive procedural rights and a substantive right to shape their
child’s educational program.121 Parents’ interests can diverge from the interests of
children in special education disputes.122 For instance, parents may seek to place their
child in an institutionalized educational setting to ease the burden of caring for the child
115
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at home when the child would gain greater benefit from a more inclusive setting.123
Arbitrators should be alert for such conflicts, and focus on reaching a decision in the best
interest of the child without infringing parental rights.
To help the arbitral panel reach a child-centered decision, one of the arbitrators
should take responsibility for focusing on the child’s interests, as distinct from the
parties’ interests. Because the disability expert on the arbitration panel is best-positioned
to understand the interests, challenges, and capabilities of the child, the disability expert
should be charged with this responsibility. Because parents have the right and
responsibility to enforce their children’s rights under IDEA,124 the parents should select
the particular arbitrator who will fill that role. Therefore, parents should select the
individual arbitrator who will serve as the disability expert, and that arbitrator should be
explicitly instructed to focus on the interests of the child rather than the parties.
2. School-student conflicts
Schools regularly make difficult decisions about how to use their scarce resources
to further their educational missions.125 While schools may be better positioned to
understand the costs and benefits of individual special education services than arbitrators,
perverse incentives may cause schools to miscalculate when weighing costs and
benefits.126 For instance, when a school receives a flat grant for each student with a
disability, schools have incentive to under-identify students with more costly disabilities,
and over-identify students with less costly disabilities.127 Additionally, incentives to
demonstrate short-term effectiveness of special education services may cause schools to
undervalue long-term benefits of such services.128 Arbitrators should be alert for factors
which may cause schools to miscalculate the value of a special education service, and
123
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accord appropriate weight to schools’ determinations. These considerations are
becoming more crucial with the rise of the charter school movement, where market
accountability principles increasingly come into conflict with the civil-rights based
principles of special education.129
C. Procedural Fairness
Arbitration can only serve as a valid alternative in special education disputes if it
is fair. Maintaining fairness can be especially tricky in processes which value efficiency,
such as arbitration, since its administrators must make tradeoffs between efficiency and
fairness. Nevertheless, arbitration can achieve fairness through dedication to fair
procedures. Two aspects of procedural fairness, subjective fairness and arbitrator
selection, are particularly relevant to special education arbitration.
Subjective fairness, the parties’ perceptions of the fairness of a process,130 is a
particularly appropriate measure in special education disputes. Because a primary
criticism of the DPH is its lack of subjective fairness,131 arbitration’s success as a
meaningful alternative to the DPH process depends largely on whether it achieves
subjective fairness. Additionally, parties who perceive a process as procedurally fair are
more likely to view its outcome as substantively fair, and comply with its outcomes even
when doing so is inconsistent with their preferences.132
Professor Nancy Welsh133 has identified four characteristics which are highly
predictive of subjective fairness: first, the parties have an opportunity “tell their story;”
second, the decision-maker demonstrates consideration of the parties’ stories; third, the
decision-maker signals even-handedness and open-mindedness; and fourth, the parties are
treated in a dignified, respectful manner.134 Accordingly, parties should be given a
thorough opportunity to “tell their story” using a familiar format. Furthermore,
arbitrators should demonstrate that they have heard the parties, such as explicitly
addressing disputants’ arguments during an oral hearing. Additionally, arbitrators should
signal their even-handedness by, for example, holding proceedings at a neutral site.135
129
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Finally, arbitral proceedings should maintain a level of social formality that conveys
dignity and respect for all the parties.
In addition to subjective fairness, procedural fairness can also be enhanced
through an equitable method of selecting arbitrators. Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal
would follow the common arbitral practice of each party choosing an arbitrator, and the
two party-selected arbitrators jointly choosing the third “neutral” arbitrator.136 Because
the educator-arbitrator’s professional judgment is likely to be the most crucial factor in
arbitral decisions,137 the educator-arbitrator should be the neutral arbitrator to preserve
the neutrality of the panel as a whole. As discussed supra, parents should choose the
disability expert because IDEA recognizes parents as the primary advocates of their
child’s interests, and the disability expert is best-positioned to understand those
interest.138 The remaining arbitrator, the attorney, should be selected by schools.
D. Mutual Acceptance
While special education arbitration ought to focus on the interests of the child,
parents, and schools are unlikely to agree to arbitration if the process disregards their
interests. Because arbitration would only commence with the consent of the parties, its
viability as a dispute resolution option depends on its ability to craft solutions that are
mutually acceptable to the parties. Arbitrators are more likely to reach a mutually
acceptable resolution by incorporating a problem-solving approach in their decisionmaking.139 Under this approach, arbitrators would focus on understanding the parties’
underlying interests, 140 and may “probe and even push for explanations and underlying
interests from both school officials and parents.”141 Once these interests are surfaced,
arbitrators may engage with the parties in generating options to serve those interests.142
Arbitrators can generate options by soliciting proposals from the parties or engaging in
brainstorming sessions à la mediation.143 Unlike mediation, however, the ultimate
decision would lie with the arbitrators.
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V. CONCLUSION
As Congress prepares to reauthorize IDEA, stakeholders are pressing Congress to
revise IDEA’s dispute resolution regime. While both due process hearings and mediation
occupy prominent and perhaps essential roles in IDEA’s dispute resolution system, the
shortcomings of each process leave some disputants with no satisfactory method of
resolving special education disputes. Professor Rosenfeld’s proposed arbitration
alternative may offer the right framework to fill this gap. To extend consideration of
Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal, this article has explored how an arbitration alternative for
special education disputes could help shape legal standards, handle principal-agent
problems, achieve procedural fairness, and reach for mutual acceptance. With these
considerations in mind, dispute resolution designers and practitioners should strive to
steer processes toward outcomes that are right “as a matter of law and fact.”144
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